

Christian Culture Lectures
11 Dewey Ave.
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Lecture by
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Following the introduction by Dr. Leo F. Simpson, Dr. Adler's lecture follows:

My memory of the discussion we had here last year is so pleasant that I am delighted to be with you again, and I hope that after the lecture we shall have another similar forum period'. This evening I am going to talk to you not primarily about this war, but about the wars that may follow this war and about the peace, the ultimate peace, that may come.

With your permission, then, I shall depart a little from the title as announced, because to talk about geopolitics strictly as the science of winning this war is to talk about the matter as a German would, as a Nazi member of Karl Haushofer's Munich Institute of Geopolitics or as a member of the German general staff. For them, geopolitics is a name for a collection, a very wide collection of facts of high strategic and tactical importance in the disposition of troops and men in a war with other nations of this whole globe

But I am going to use the word "geopolitics" in the course of this evening. I am going to take from them the word geopolitics because I think that it is a good word. I am going to use it and get it into your minds as a name for a way of thinking that must dominate our American consciousness even as geopolitics now has come to dominate the popular mind of Germany, but with a different insight and with a different purpose.

They regard it as the understanding of man's possession of the land and sea areas with a view to providing the most successful means

for the German people to dominate the globe.

The idea that is involved in the notion of geopolitics is both old and new, both good and bad, As long ago as Aristotle, and, as a matter of fact, as the Greek political geographers writing in the Roman period, men understood that the growth of states and wars and peaces were determined by the necessary movement of peoples from less fertile to more fertile lands, expanding under the economic pressure of the need for resources or food, or expanding because the will for conquest: turned them In the direction of pivotal points on the earth's surface from which they could command valleys or riverways or great inland seas. When I was in school I remember reading a book by a professor of history at the University of California, a book called "The Processes of History." The word "geopolitics" apparently did not come into it at all, but the author, himself a student of Professor Huntington at Yale, a great geographer, saw all the movements of. history in terms of climatic; and geographic determinations. I say this is not a new idea. In *that* sense it is not a new idea.

What is new about it? And this is where I think the idea becomes something useful to us, -not for the sake of war, but for the sake of peace It is the strict meaning of the word "geo" in connection with politics. The word "geo" is the Greek word for earth. You can think of that in a limited sense as any area of the earth's surface. In that sense the problem of the political dimensions of the Mediterranean world is a problem in geopolitics. But the ultimate meaning of the word "geo" is earth in the global sense, the whole spinning sphere. Therefore I suggest to you that the notion of geopolitics implies a politics of the globe and I am going to come back and develop this in the course of the evening. It can be a warlike politics of the globe or a peaceful polities of the globe, but a politics, a political thinking which is no longer limited to nations, to areas of continents, or continents, or hemispheres, but whose extent is the whole spinning sphere. That, I say, *is* a new idea.

I think it is only in very recent years that anyone began to think of the world as the globe. We all talked about the world. Let me use one example to make my point. We speak of Alexander's conquering the world, of Alexander at the age of 22, crying because there were no more worlds to conquer, He was right. In his meaning of world, there *were* no more worlds to conquer because the world to him was not the world as it *is* but the world image he carried around with him. That world image was a geographical section, the eastern Mediterranean, going north to the Bosphorus, going down into Asia Minor, and to the gates of India, and stretching a little bit

into Africa. That was the world. And the Roman talked about the world. What was their belief? We know now that their image was the image of the Mediterranean, the great inland sea, with the gates of ocean at one end and Asia Minor at the other, and the fringes of civilization in the dark forests of the north and the deserts of the south. That was the world. Down into the 18th century if Europeans talked about world conquest, if Napoleon talked about world conquest, if Gustavus Adolphus or Charles the Twelfth of Sweden thought about world conquest, I assure you, his notion, his image of the world didn't stray much beyond the boundaries of Europe.

I say it is tremendously significant, then, that when we use the word "world" and talk about a world war, a world peace, for the first time we mean the World in an image that accurately corresponds to the world as it is. And in that sense geopolitics is new. It is new for us to think about the world in this way as it is new for the Germans, a conquering race, to think about world dominion not in some limited segment of the earth's surface, but the spherical surface of this planet.

The idea of geopolitics, by the way, is not a German invention. The Germans think that the first real expression of geopolitics was the Monroe Doctrine. They think that we really invented the idea—the notion of demarking a sphere of the earth's surface as a political entity, as having certain political meaning, as involving certain threats of war and peace if trespassed upon. They say that was real geopolitical thinking.

But the man who influenced the Germans, that is, the inventor of the idea, is a great English political geographer not a German, Sir Halford McKinder, whose book, "Political Realities" I recommend to all of you because you can more readily grasp the subject than from a German book. It is written in words of almost one syllable. (No German could write about a pompous idea like geopolitics in words of less than five.) I want to call your attention here again, to make the thing perfectly clear, that there isn't much difference between the Germans' word "liebensraum" and the English phrase "the lifelines of empire." I want you to notice the word "life" in both, "living space" for the Germans. and "lifelines of empire" for the English.

So far it would seem that geopolitical thinking has been done by any country such as ours, or England, or Germany which has ever indulged, even in the least, (and we are all guilty) in imperialistic aspirations. Such remarks as those of "our hemispheric solidarity" are remarks which suggest even more the kind of thinking to which

Americans are accustomed, which they do not call geopolitical, but which the Germans would call so.

Now the basic myth which underlies the German and British controversy here (and the Germans follow the British) is the myth of the "world island"; the myth that McKinder named under the phrase, "the heartlands of the world." It is that body of the earth's surface including a large portion of central Europe, a portion of western Asia and of northern Africa which is totally unattackable by the powers that control the sea. Therefore, from this island in the center of the world's land and water which is impregnable from the sea, its peoples can spread out over the lands, can gain sea power, can control the sea then, and so control the world. Both Germany and Russia are physically nearer that heart island than any other country.

The map that McKinder made in 1903 shows the United States on the fringes, the very outer fringes, of the ocean periphery of this heart island. We could make no claims to world domination in McKinder's sense so the Germans have constructed other maps to show that we have really good possibilities, geographically, for becoming a world dominion. As a matter of fact, we need waste no time on the issue between Admiral Mahon and the idea that he who controls the sea controls the world, and the McKinder-Hausofer idea of the heartland and the control of the world through it, because something has happened, happened very recently, that dates all these ideas and makes them quite ineffective.

I cannot tell you how simple and how moving and how profound this one fact is. There are continents on the surface of the earth; there are inland bodies of water; there are oceans that are in some sense defined by the continental peripheries which-enclose them, And so we think of the oceans as belonging in different areas of the earth's surface and somehow dominated by certain tribes of the earth's peoples. But the fact is that the world is encompassed by *one air-ocean*. There are no artificial lines through the three-dimensional space that envelopes the planet. There is only one air-ocean and that one air-ocean, as you know, will be completely circumnavigable in a day within fifty years. (I mean that flying around the globe in a day will be a matter of fact. You can predict it now as you can predict the increase of speed between Chicago and New York.) And when the one air-ocean of the world is circumnavigable in a day, the heartland and the high seas will no longer play the role of geographical significance that McKinder assigned them in 1903, or that, the Germans still do. The air and air power have changed the whole picture of political geography by

adding a third dimension in which there are no barriers and which is unity itself in the way in which it is the planet's envelope.

Now I have said that the idea is both *old* and *new*, and now I want to say that the idea is both *good* and *bad*, a vicious idea, and an idea that is worth harboring and letting grow in your mind. As used by the enemy, I say that it is a vicious idea. It is nothing but an extension of what we would call power-politics. It is merely an auxiliary of power-politics, the real politics, the kind of realistic politics which is not concerned with peace and justice but only with the domination, the control of larger and larger areas of the earth's surface.

There are other notions apart from those of the Germans, apart from recent Nazi ideology, which are as bad, and I want to discuss them at once; because it isn't merely geopolitics that, to my mind, expresses the same kind of vicious power-politics on the international scene. Anyone who still thinks in terms of power, anyone who still thinks in terms of power-blocs, of one concert of great nations against another concert of great nations, anyone who thinks of dividing the earth's surface into spheres of influence with inferior races living in spheres of influence governed by the spoils-takers, at their will, anyone who thinks in pan-ideas, (even if be pan-American, which is just as bad as pan-Teutonic, because what is wrong with it is not "American" but "pan" as the prefix to the name of any particular group on the earth's surface)—all these are other disguises for the same thing, power-politics, the lust for domination of the earth's surface, no regard for right, a use of might viciously and irresponsibly for the control of peoples and of property.

The German, then, if he thinks of peace at all, thinks of peace as a brief interlude between wars. I say that this is just as true of the American. If there are Americans, as I suspect there are, who are realistic in their thinking, they will admit this. Let me name one for you who is just as bad as any German, a professor at Yale, John Nicholas, whose book, "America in World Politics" is just as much a statement of how we can dominate the world if we use our possessions and our skill properly, and our resources, as any German would write. It seems no less despicable in the Yale professor, than in the Munich professor, Haushofer. I say that when a German thinks of peace he thinks of it merely as a brief interlude between this and the next war because wars must go on. Wars are in the nature of the case. Wars are the way in which power is extended. You merely want the peace to consolidate the victory, to consolidate it for the beginning of another attack until world dominion as

the ultimate goal has been reached.

Now, I say, one does not have to be unrealistic, and I object to having my opponents here, in thought, take *that* word realistically. I am willing to take it away altogether and speak of idealistic politics,—if it is understood that in doing so I am not being naive, unaware of the facts, with my head in the clouds and my feet far from the ground. I insist that one can be an idealist with his feet as firmly planted on the ground as any realist is who has his head there as well as his feet. I say that when those of us who are willing to think of ourselves as idealists in politics think about a peace we are not thinking about that interlude which prepares us for the winning of another war. We are thinking about a peace which is good because it will be just and it will be durable. The only thing we care about in peace, the main thing we care about in peace, is its durability.

We wish to have justice too. But our understanding of war is as a disease. War is not of the nature of the body politic or of the society of nations. It is an aggravated failing, a defect which can be cured. We regard peace as the normal state of man upon this planet, although that has not yet been achieved. I want to make you see how we are nearing the point in history where it becomes more realistic and less idealistic to talk about world peace as a real available thing. When I say a just and lasting peace I want to state something about the relation of those two things. I think it is more important, ultimately more important, that the peace be lasting than it be just. I also know that it cannot be ultimately lasting unless it is just.

On the other hand, I do know that the peace may be quite just and not durable at all. I think that there have been many just peaces made at the ends of wars only to be fractured within another 25 or 50 years. The justice of the peace will not guarantee its permanence. A lasting peace must be thought of in terms that exceed the province of a just disposition, after a war is over. When I think of peace in this world I cannot help thinking in terms of a coincidence which Elmer Davis pointed out in a recent paper from his office, the coincidence of the two years, 1942 and 1492. In 1492 a new hemisphere was discovered. In 1942 men are beginning to discover that there are no hemispheres. It is that fact, that there are no hemispheres, that there will be progressively no hemispheres, or continents, or barriers, or islands in any ocean that there can be a just and lasting peace.

I would argue for it first from principle to show you why this must be true. When I say must be true, you know from some experience

of me that I don't mean may be true. I mean *must be true*, without any qualifications and with no apologies to anybody. I will stick my neck out and have you throw rocks at me for the purpose of seeing if you can meet my contention that this is demonstrated. I say I am going to demonstrate it one way from principle, and a second way, less certainly, but also with a great deal of probability, imaginatively from the array of historical facts which show the significance of the year 1942 in the world's history. My thesis simply is: that a lasting and just peace is possible on one condition and *one condition only*, nothing else. That is my point. *Nothing else* will make a, peace lasting. *That condition is* that on the surface of this globe there be *one political community* to equal the physical and economic unity of the earth's surface and its peoples. Nothing less than that, nothing less than one political community;—that means *one government, one sovereignty*, however many inferior and limited sovereignties it may subordinate, *one sovereignty, one constitution*. Nothing less than that will ever provide for the peoples of the earth a permanent peace.

Even that peace, as you realize, may be shattered in the course of years by civil wars and local insurrections. I am going to show you that civil wars and local insurrections are relatively good conflicts. Our American Civil War is, among the wars I know about, a splendid war. It had some meaning. It had principles on both sides. It did decide something of great political significance. Civil wars are fine wars compared with national wars precisely because they are civil. They are within the body politic,—not between purely anarchic, individual, autonomous, sovereign nations.

This thesis, in general, must be understood apart from any institutional set-up. I would like to have you think with me about this thing in its most general terms. Please do not think of how it would be set up. Don't bother about the plans of union now. Don't bother about the plans for an Atlantic Confederation into which other nations would be admitted when they have passed the period of probation. Don't ask yourself, Will there be double or triple or quadruple tiers of subordinate sovereignty? Don't ask yourself, What kind of house of parliament will it contain? Ask yourself none of these questions. These are all questions about detail and means. They are important questions, but keep for the moment the main idea, which is that nothing short of one political community can provide peace for the people of this earth.

If you keep that in front of you, let me accentuate its point by saying what it does not mean. It does *not* mean leagues of nations. A league of nations is no better in weight of force than the paper on

which the league is described. It does *not* mean treaties. It does *not* mean alignments of nations, even deciding to use the armed forces temporarily for police power. Unfortunately our political leaders, Mr. Hoover on the one hand, Mr. Hull on the other, have dared to go no further than to talk about leagues in some loose sense, with some loose sense of police power being used. But leagues and police powers leave the nations sovereign; still leave them autonomous and anarchic individuals. Treaties are worth nothing. No treaty is worth anything in the international order. It is a scrap of paper as Bismarck properly said. It is a gentleman's agreement. But you cannot keep peace by gentleman's agreements among the nations any more than you can keep peace within the city of Rochester by gentleman's agreements among its citizens. Try and do it for a week.

What I am talking about is a single sovereignty, with a single economy, a culture that is unified to some extent, and a real equalization of peoples;—no “White Man's Burden”, no inferior races. I say this means (and these are hard words but I would like to speak them plainly) I say that if you accept this idea it means the end of nationalism, the end of imperialism, the end of capitalism as we know it. I would like also to add that I think this is what the “four freedoms” mean.¹ I think the four freedoms are dynamite.

Nothing short of a single economy can provide peace. First, deductively as a rather universal principle,—it arises from the very na-

¹ The “Four Freedoms” are from a speech given an address give by President “In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”

Archivist's note.

ture of human government that what you understand by government (not government in the case of an angelic society) but human government, always, always, always involves *two* elements and never *one*. There is no human government by *right* alone. Right or justice, authority by itself will not produce an ordered peaceful society anywhere in the world. Right, justice, law, authority must always be supported by force, police. Human law demands this; not law alone but law with enforceable sanctions. Human government is authority which carries with it the power to enforce itself, physically enforce itself, coercively enforce itself.

Either of the two extremes gives you a bad realism or a bad idealism. It gives you the bad idealism of the simple-minded superficial anarchists who suppose that men can live together by mere conversations, by gentleman's agreements, by understanding one another. This is as remote from the nature of man (and if you are a Christian, you might add, as remote from the *fallen* nature of man) as anything in this world. The other extreme is the notion that government is by *might* alone, which means that it is merely an organization of violence and not a just disposition of the human community for its peace and order.

I am going to read you a brief quotation which I used in a recent article in "The Commonwealth" because the words of Alexander Hamilton seem to be magnificently clear on the subject. In the 51st of the "Federalist Papers" which appeared Feb. 6, 1778 in which Hamilton was arguing for certain aspects of the federal constitution which involved the partition of powers to make it possible to enforce sanctions against any officer of the United States government, he argued, I quote. "It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government, but what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" Then follows this magnificent sentence: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men neither internal nor external control would be necessary." Let me repeat now and expand: 'If men were angels, no government would be necessary. Now you understand what Hamilton means there. He is not making a theological error. He is not saying that there is not order and authority in the angelic hierarchy. He is saying that if men were angels, the kind of government we now have which combines *force* with *reason* would not be necessary. The mere expression of reason would be authoritative in the direction of the members of society.

Let me go on to add what Hamilton does not say, because it completes the picture. If men were brutes, no government would be

necessary either. Be possible, I should say. If men were angels, no government involving reason and force would be necessary. If men were brutes, no government involving reason and force would be possible. For among brutes there is nothing but an organization of power. Now just as among brutes the kind of individual government combining reason and power would be impossible;—justice and might, law and force, doesn't exist, and just as it doesn't exist among angels—you see that *from the nature of man*, his animality, his rationality, (somehow an extraordinary mixture, if you want to call it such, of the angel and the brute, half angel, half brute) *requires this particular kind of government*, is directed to justice, and at the same time must support reason and justice by coercive force, compelling, moving force.

Now, in exactly the same terms, I say, if men were angels *war* would be impossible. If men were brutes, *peace* would be impossible. But because men are neither angels nor brutes, men do make wars and it is also equally possible for them to avoid wars and live in peace. If men were angels war would be impossible as you understand. There is no meaning to angelic strife. If men were brutes there would be no meaning to peace. There might be temporary truces in the jungle, but in the jungle there is no peace. Peace is the product of reason.

War comes not from man's rationality, but it comes from his animality. By a proper use of force: in conjunction with reason, war can be avoided and peace made possible. Now I say that this is, to my mind at least, absolutely convincing and final reasoning. If in the city of Rochester, if in the State of New York, if in the nation of the United States, (I don't care how large or small the community is) for this multitude (let it be a hundred, a thousand, ten million) if in order for this multitude to live together in peace and order, if there is required always the kind of government which supports justice by force, a unified government which has the power to enforce its authority and its laws, then, I say, expand the picture to include all the peoples on the earth's surface, and the *same truth holds*. Have one government with law and the power to enforce it and you will have just as much peace on the whole surface of the earth as you have peace within known communities now, where the only disturbances are not called war, but crime, and where the agencies of law and government are relatively, not absolutely, effective in the maintenance of peace by punishment and suppression of criminals.

The reason why you must see this is that as the world is now constituted you have anarchy. I want to be sure that you know what I

mean by anarchy. If you and I were to try to live together, if the people in this room were to try to live together on any area of the earth's surface by nothing but agreements, with no one over them to govern them, but merely by their word and nothing more, they would be living anarchically. At any moment, anyone could attack and there would be nothing but the combined might of others to defend that one or oppose that one. At any moment war may break out. War breaks out in this group because there is no way to settle disputes. There is no agency of government.

I say that in the world at large the individual nations are like you and myself, like so many individual people, each autonomous, each a limited sovereign with no sovereign over him. The myth of International Law has grossly misled us. You know that International Law is not positive law. You know that law requires police power. You know that law requires an authority adequate and responsible, and International Law is nothing but a moral document. Moral documents are not enough for men to live at peace with one another. They require law supported by force.

If this is right, you will see one thing before I make my second point. You will see that war is inevitable. You can blame Hitler, I suppose. You can blame this person and that. But if you really want to get above the level of the rhetoric of the moment, you will see that this war, like every other war, had to break out, Maybe if it hadn't been for Hitler, or this accident or that, it wouldn't have happened in 1939, but 1945. Maybe it wouldn't have happened this way but that way. But that is indifferent. You realize that it doesn't make much difference, after a war has started, how it started. The reason why it started, the reason why this war was inevitable (and, though it is a painful remark to make) the reason why after this war, more wars will be inevitable (the reasons are the same)—peace breaks down. Peace breaks down because there is no agency whereby the competing and conflicting claims of sovereign and anarchic individuals can be adjudicated. World Courts, Leagues of Nations, International treaties, I say, are powerless. They have been proved powerless. Nations regard themselves as a moral influence. War breaks out. (I am going to speak almost too lightly here, but I am going to make a point this way.) *War breaks out because conversation fails*. Just think of that point. Conversation is a name for the peaceful interchange of ideas among men. You and I argue; you and I differ. Practically and theoretically, we converse. And when conversation fails, we fight.

There is nothing else for us to do. We are rational animals. We talk as long as we are rational and fight when we must because we are

animals. When conversation fails, we fight. Now in the civil order of the state, there is a way of preventing conversation from failing. We go to a court, we enter pleas and answers and rejoinders; there is a systematic process for the administration of law, for arbitration, for negotiation, and for enforcement of the decree upon us. And so, though conversations often do fail, we have a way of solving the problem at that point without turning from talking to fighting. Courts can adjudicate disputes by law and enforce that adjudication. But this can be done on only one condition; only on the condition that you recognize that just as peace in any small community requires one government, not two, one sovereign one authority and power to enforce it, so in the whole wide world there is no peace possible without that same pattern.

I shall go to my second argument quickly. It is an argument from history. The facts of history illuminate us on this point. Let me begin with what I mentioned before as Aristotle's insight, in the opening pages of the "Politics." In the course of the development of the city-state one can trace its origin back to the original families who intermarried, colonized with one another and formed tribes. The tribes lived contiguously, competing economically, overpowering one another and gradually amalgamating to form the very small states that we think of as the Greek city-states. Think of that picture for a moment. It is a very simple picture. It conforms to the nature of man's political organization on the surface of this planet because of the earth's surface itself, distribution of goods, propinquity in space, and the tendency of man to talk of power. Small groups that live close by which have no single government over them will be in anarchy with one another and anarchy always leads to war. The only way to stop war at that point is to remove anarchy. How do you remove anarchy? By having an amalgamation. I am not going to tell how it was achieved. It was accomplished, in a word, by conquest. The stronger neighbor imposed itself upon the weaker ones. I am not judging the morals of the question for the time being. I am merely saying that as a result of that conquest, a little larger area of the earth's surface had peace for a time because, before these peoples that could be at war are now living under one political community.

Think of all ancient history. Think of the conflict between Greece and Persia. Think of that conflict, at a point in which the Persians said, "The world is not large enough for our kind of government to exist side by side with the Greek constitutional states." And it wasn't right. They infringed upon one another. Then something had to happen. What happened, as you know was that the Greeks threw off the Persian yoke in the east and the west and then some-

thing very interesting happened. There flourished for about 50 years in Athens, in Corinth, in Sparta, in Thebes, and countless small cities, at first, constitutional republics. But not for long. Each of these, particularly the larger and wealthier ones, very soon became imperialistic. Each tried to associate itself with nearby cities, forming the Spartan confederacy, or the Athenian confederacy, or the Corinthian hegemony. And that, I assure you, the formation of confederacies, hegemonies, etc. was for the purpose of power politics, as the Peloponnesian War showed. Sparta and Corinth went into the battle for a final showdown with their imperialistic neighbor, Athens. Athens, remember was a most glorious place of Grecian culture but Athens was as much the symbol of power-politics, imperialism, grabbing of land and colonies in the ancient world as even England and we would be today. We also are symbols of culture.

Greek imperialism, however, did not come to its end this way. It came to its end through the conquest of an outsider from the north, Alexander the Great. Alexander is, in European records at least, the first world conqueror. He does, for a short space, bring peace by conquest by bringing all the cities and these lands, from Thrace to southern Arabia and as far as India, under one head. It breaks up and you have the same thing repeated.

How does Rome begin? As so many tribes upon the seven hills, and those tribes amalgamate with a powerful one dominating until Rome becomes one city; until Rome becomes one city upon the seven hills. Then Rome, from one city on seven hills, spreads out until the whole of Italy belongs to the city of Rome.

There was peace there when the Pax Romana prevailed. What was the Pax Romana? It was the Roman peace, a peace established, I think, by the force of arms, by domination. These are the antecedents, but the real point *is* that for a short time Rome governed. And I really mean governed, though not with equality on all sides. But they *did* govern with *law*, and they attempted, through the efforts of praetors, to bring a foreign kind of law into the body of the Roman Law itself. Notice how peace is extended over larger areas in this way.

Now let me tell you the Medieval story, because the Medieval story beginning in the 7th or 8th century runs right down to yesterday. There is no line of demarcation. One of the things that we are badly taught in history is its division into three eras, ancient, medieval, and modern. I think no good historian could ever draw a line between the middle ages and the modern world either economically

or politically. It is an absolutely continuous transition. It has never been admitted that the Medieval world ends and the Modern world begins. There are *crucial* dates, but politically and economically it is one slow movement gaining momentum as the years go on. How does it begin? It begins at a period of chaos,—the breakdown of the one great empire that had brought peace to the world. It begins by going all the way back to local government and the greatest real anarchy, because in the early days of the feudal system, the government is the government of one manor, this manorial lord, his serfs, his animals, his family. He was peer, co-equal in sovereignty with the man, who lived next door on the next manor. Slowly this became impossible. The barons fought with one another. The richer and more powerful barons formed counties and became counts, and duchies became dukes; and the counts and the dukes fought with one another, and thus arose the king.

I want you to understand how the medieval king is not like the ancient king, not like the Persian king. The medieval king is an invention of the barons as an officer of peace. As the Romans talked about the Pax Romana, so the English in the 11th and 12th centuries talked about the King's Peace, the King's Sheriff, the King's Law, because that was the only way the barons could live together. They set a king over them as a law enforcement officer to somehow indicate that when these peers disputed they could go to somebody else, the king's courts. If you are one baron and I am another baron and we dispute, you won't settle the dispute in my court. Each baronial establishment has a court, but obviously one cannot be judge in his own case, so we both go to the king's court. Moreover, this only works because the king actually has superior power—King's Peace. If he does not have superior power, after the decree is given we turn our backs on him and walk off and do as we please. But the King's Peace can be enforced by his sheriffs and his soldiers.

Do you know the history of England on this point? After all there were many kings in England as in France, (or men who were almost their equal—great dukes and earls.) In England there was the King of Northumbria, the King of Essex, the King of Scotland, the King of Wales, the King of Cornwall, and the King of England, who is only one of the kings. Think for a moment of that one little island. Think of the tortuous process over centuries by which the people of that island became unified. (As you notice, I leave the adjacent island, Ireland, out. Even I wouldn't dare to mention that, I think that the problems of the world could be solved if we leave Ireland out.) On that one island of England Scotland and Wales it took centuries to bring about unification under one king. And in all

the many centuries that it *didn't* happen there were the wars—the Wars of the Roses between different houses claiming the English crown, the wars between the Welsh and the English and the Scotch.

The same thing happened in France, until under the Bourbons France becomes one kingdom. Now at the same time (this is part of the story) another phenomena was occurring in Europe. In central Europe the Hapsburg house, part Austrian, part Spanish, forms the Holy Roman Empire of the German People. Don't ever use that phrase without completing it. It is not the Holy Roman Empire. It is the Holy Roman Empire of the German People. That was a different experiment in peace. You know in general the structure of the empire. There was the emperor, an elected official; the electors—men such as the Count Palatinate of the Rhine, the Dukes of Saxony and Hess, of Austria, and the kings of Spain, The Emperor, however, unlike the kings that dominated Europe and France is a figure.

This was the beginning of an experiment that didn't see its way to the end. It was something like a league of nations. But the point I want to make now is the competing character of Nationalism in England and France and also in Holland at that time, and the Holy Roman Empire of the German People which was not nationalistic at all because it included many nations, Slavic and Spanish as well as Teutonic. Who won this contest? You know. The nationalistic peoples won. The Holy Roman Empire was effectively destroyed. No man did more to destroy it than Richelieu, the Cardinal Prime Minister of France—by using the best power-politics of his day to defeat the combination of peoples who were opposed to French dominance on the continent of Europe. From that day to this Richelieu paves the way for Napoleon; Richelieu and with him England pave the way for modern Nationalistic imperialism. And that, from Napoleon to our own day, is the story of imperialism on the continent of Europe, gradually spreading beyond the little domains of England and France. (Napoleon thought of a peace of Europe under his dominion. This may have been an afterthought, for he had it at St. Helena. However, he could see that *conquest* might have led to the unification of Europe under one dominion.)

The British Empire, starting imperialistically, power-seeking, land-grabbing, commerce-taking, does turn out, however you may feel about the matter, in the course of years, to be a confederation of commonwealths spread out all over the world. So you see how all of history, if you read it in any terms whatsoever, is a history of the slow extension of domains. I care not for the moment whether it is

by conquest or by federation. The point is that the whole motion is a motion of men amalgamating into larger and larger communities. And they must. The same pressures force them. The same economic conflicts demand it. The same lack of agencies to prevent war require it.

This is the *first* world war. Though the same factors have been at work up until this, the last world war was *not* a world war. No one during the last war thought of the world. We are the first people, we and the English and the Germans, are the first people on the earth's surface to think of the war in terms of the whole world and are beginning to think of peace in terms of the whole world. This is the first world war because in a geopolitical sense this is the first war that even is suggested as being fought for the domination of the world, and those who fight that domination have begun to think of the *United Nations of the World*. Whoever coined that phrase, be it Churchill or Roosevelt was a brilliant rhetorician. We might have said Allies again, the Allies against the Axis, but think of what Allies meant. Allies is just one power-bloc against Axis, another power-bloc as the Allies and the Entente were in the last war. But the phrase, (and it may only be a phrase, but it is a pregnant one) the "United Nations of the World", suggests something else, not a power-bloc, but the strict parallel to the United States of America—*one* government, *one* political unity, *one* law, *one* authority, throughout the globe's surface.

You notice also that as this picture has enlarged what has happened is this, that as the wars grew larger, the "peaces" grew larger. (I am sorry that the word "peaces" is so bad there but I don't know what the plural of the word peace would be but "peaces") In the progress of the world the wars have covered larger areas, larger groups of people. When they are concluded one way or another the peace that reigns for, a while extends over larger areas and over larger group of people. The thing which brings us now to the conclusion, which say now again proves my original thesis, is this: we now see as maybe even fifteen years ago we didn't, that *there is no natural limit to the expansion and unification of peoples short of the world itself*. Fifty years ago there were people who said "Men will stretch to the edge of Europe. They will go to the Urals, but not across the Urals. They will stay on the continent of Europe in their wars. They won't go from the eastern to the western hemisphere. There will be no fight between hemispheres." Because oceans were impassible, mountain barriers were impassible, rivers were natural barriers to which you expanded and stopped.

But no longer can you think of any natural barriers. All the interior

barriers on the earth's surface are completely wiped out by *air*. There are no longer any natural barriers, it is all one. And that being the physical fact, the physical, geopolitical fact it must follow that wars will continue and continue and continue until the limit is reached, which is,—the expansion of government or the political community to cover the whole surface of the globe,—a physical and economic unity which exists now and which requires to correlate with it a political unity which must be achieved somehow.

Whatever I say from this point on, however disheartening it may be, (and it will be that) changes not one bit the truth of what I have said so far. However far away the true condition that must be reached is, it is still true that condition must be reached before peace is established. Now let me tell you the difficulties. They are difficulties, and what any of us who is willing in our own day and age to think about the problem should face squarely and without any illusions, even though it runs against the grain on many points. In the first place the basic issue is whether this world dominion, this world political unity will be brought about by *conquest* or by *federation*. Hitler's way of doing it, as you know, is by conquest. That was Napoleon's. That is the way, I say, of all American isolationists. I would like to make my point,—that isolationism is nationalism is imperialism. Those three are exactly the same, identical in principle, in motive, and in end. The choice is whether it be by us or by somebody else, between conquest and federation. How can you determine which is the better? If you are just talking pragmatically now, I think I can tell you why federation is better than conquest. Because a lasting peace, which is what you want, *cannot* be achieved by conquest. Conquest cannot bring it about unless it is rectified at once by a most just disposition to the conquered of their rights, which is unlikely. Unless conquest is followed by just rectifications, the injustice imposed by conquest is merely the seething seed of another war. You want a lasting peace; then it must be with justice, and as it cannot be by conquest, hence it must be by the federation of these peoples. I say only federation, or a victory which some way, whether by us or by the enemy, leads to federation can set up a just constitution for world government.

If anyone says to me, as I am sure from this audience many persons will say, "Federation is impossible," all I want to say dialectically in rejoinder is, to that person who says that federation is impossible, that person also must admit that world peace is impossible. He may be right. But that person is also saying, there never will be peace on this earth. It is impossible. I think he is wrong. I think it is quite possible and I think these two facts of history that I am going to show you" now show its possibilities despite the diffi-

culties which I shall mention in a moment. The Holy Roman Empire is one case, a case which was not like the Greek hegemonies and confederacies, but really an attempt to bring about an organization of peace for a lot of different nations, different cultures, different groups. But do not forget for one moment (and we who are its children are most likely to forget) one of the most extraordinary experiments that ever took place in this world bearing on this current issue, and that is the American Federation.

I wish that every man and woman in this country were forced to read the Federalist Papers year in, year out. In the first ten pages of these documents, largely written by Madison, though some are by Jay and Hamilton, what are these men considering? They are considering the question of war and peace on this continent. They argue that there is no way of having peace on this continent except by giving up the Articles of Confederation among the thirteen colonies, (which is nothing but a league of nations, a peace treaty with no sanctions) and founding a strong Federal government. And do you suppose the people of Virginia, the people of North Carolina, the people of New York, the people of Maine wanted to do that? You know, don't you as much as I do, how strong the states-rights sentiment was, how much these people wanted to preserve the independent absolute unlimited sovereignty of their local communities? And you also know how nearly the Federalists were beaten, almost by a scratch. If they had been beaten, there would have been wars and wars upon this continent as there were in Europe. That there has been none, except for the one civil war between the states, is, I think, a very interesting proof not only that federation, but federal government is possible and that it works.

But you may say to me "But that doesn't prove much, because these people were of one ethnic group they all had the same language all had the same culture and general background; that doesn't show us that it can be done on a larger scale." And I will offer you another example to show that it can. But before I do that let me call your attention to one thing that I want to use as the basis of the implication for you to think about. The important thing that the Federalists were saying to their fellow American colonists was You have to think of yourself as an American *first*, and as a member of the colony of Virginia or New York or Massachusetts *second*. So *you* must think of yourself as a citizen of the world *first* and as an American *second*. How much against the grain would that run? If there are any America-Firsters here it would run against their grain. But that is what was asked at the time of our country's founding and that is what must be asked every thinking American citizen today. Are you willing to think of yourself as an

American second and as a citizen of the world first?

Let me call your attention to one other thing about this little experiment. You know that in the first 25 or 50 years of our country's existence the federal government was as pitiable a figure in many respects as, shall I say, many of our local governments are today. The real government was the legislature of New York State or the Assembly of Virginia, or the Assembly of Massachusetts. The governors were the real government. The President of the United States was an inferior sovereign, at least in the minds of the people of the states, who looked upon the federal government as still encroaching upon them. Now watch what happens in the course of 150 years. Slowly, by mere living together, by being forced together economically, by space itself being shortened and cut, by transportation, by telephone, by steam. You knew that the states don't amount to anything today. There are still people who defend states rights but they are *really* back in the horse and buggy days. Today it is the federal government and the states are merely organs of it. I would not be surprised to have, in some not far distant future, the states broken down into large sectional areas. It would mean more efficient government than by present state lines which no longer have any meaning. There are sections of the United States which are, shall I say, subordinate agencies to the federal government, provinces. That has happened in 150 years.

If there were a world government you would have at the beginning the same thing. The United States would be more important than the world; England would be more important than the world; France would be more important than the world. But give that time. With the welding, the knitting, the coming together, the commercial attachments, the actual physical community, eventually the states would disappear. They would gradually wipe themselves out except as subordinate governmental units under the one political community.

I promised to mention one other case and that is the Swiss confederacy which is a very interesting case because it is almost as old or perhaps older than the American. There you have three distinct nations living together in peace under a federal form of government;—French Swiss, German Swiss, Italian Swiss—different customs, different languages, different backgrounds.

Then think of the English federation, the English commonwealth of nations, global in extent, and you face the difficulty that you face today. It is global, in extent and yet it is peculiarly white. India isn't in it. Burma isn't in it. None but the white races are really

in it.

The Pacific problem that this war has started cannot be discounted. It is the problem, much more important than the Atlantic problem, which must be solved before you can even begin to think pragmatically and effectively about world peace. In the first place, as this war ends, you will see the Atlantic world lined up against the Pacific world unless there is some realignment that no one now can foresee as a real potentiality. There will be two worlds which will struggle against one another until one way or another they become one world.

In the second place, in the course of forming one world out of the Atlantic and Pacific worlds, you have two problems that even the wisest man who writes about peace has very shallow suggestions about. You have the problem of the primitives and the enemy. Mr. Hoover, for instance, suggests something like a loose federation of the victorious united nations and putting the Germans and Italians and the Japanese on parole or probation for a while until they show themselves, under our tutelage and guidance, able to join a respectable society of people.

Then you have the problem of the primitives, the vast number of so-called primitive people. So-called from our white man's standards. And these, Mr. Hoover would say, have to be treated as wards, as children. I think that Mr. Hoover's intentions are good. The probation of the enemy, primitives to be treated as wards for the sake of their education and development to the point where all are represented in world government.

Then add to that the economic problem—no barriers to trade, no immigration frontiers, as there are none among the United States. Just carry the analogy out for a moment and think of the economic upheaval and reorganization which is necessary to establish freedom from want. And here you have the greatest conflict between Mr. Hoover, on the one hand and the economists on the other. Mr. Hoover, who in his "Freedom From Want" thinks only technically of it and regards the problem as a problem of supply and distribution.

This always tends to immoral distribution, unjust distribution of goods. The conflict between free enterprise and a planned economy is a conflict you must face in all the victorious nations at the end of this War. It is one that must be solved somehow before freedom from want can be a provision of world government.

Two more problems and I conclude. The political problem which is that if the world government is itself to be democratic then each of the constituent parts must be democratic. Just as in our own constitution we federally provide that every state shall have a republican form of government, (for we could not have in this union of states, some that were republican and some that were not,) so if the world state be democratic all the constituent parts must be democratic. But if you remember what it involved in that you know how much must be done before even we in the United States are ready to make democracy work.

Then think of Germany and Italy and Japan; of India and Burma. Think of the middle of Australia and the middle of Africa and you see the extent of the problem.

The educational problem for the equalization of peoples is, I think, the hardest. But if Lincoln was right when he said that a nation could not endure half free and half slave, then I say that world peace cannot endure in a world which is half free and half slave and downtrodden.

Let me summarize this by saying that the four freedoms and world peace which I think are very closely connected cannot be possible:

1. Without world government
2. Without education (of a kind that we haven't begun to give). You cannot give freedom to people. You can allow them to be free by just laws and just institutions, but freedom is something interior. It can only be used by men who have the power to use it.

Now, I think, the reason why this is a problem that you cannot avoid thinking about, though it may not look for the moment serious is that democracy cannot exist in the United States, will not be able to endure in the United States very much longer unless it gradually grows upon the whole world. In this I think that Hitler was right as Lincoln was right about the half slave, half free point, Hitler has said that the world is too small for totalitarianism and democracy to exist side by side. I say the world is now too small for people to exist on it who want peace and who want war.

The reason why democracy cannot survive in a world which isn't all gradually brought up to that level (it may sound like a very technical reason, but I think it is a very interesting one) is that in a world of power-politics you must have a very Machiavellian foreign policy. But the people as a whole cannot make a foreign poli-

cy. In fact, in a democratic government, in which the people as a tale form the policy of the government, you cannot really have any foreign policy. There is a real incompatibility between foreign policy in the sense of meeting the power-blocs of one's opponents, and democratic government. We fail always. We lag behind. There is a real weakness in democracy which will get worse and worse. If democracy is to survive, it must be so, placed in the world as not to need a foreign policy. That can only happen, obviously, when world government is provided.

Let me ask you a question. Is this thing that I am asking you to think about possible ultimately? I would say yes. I have complete optimism. Immediately I am just as much a pessimist as I am an optimist about the ultimate outcome. In fact I am a great pessimist. I think the Pacific question is the beginning of an avalanche the further motions of which we have not begun to see. I think the European problem is itself very difficult; (though less than this)—the education of Germany And the consolidation of the Atlantic peoples. I don't think that it will happen at the end of this war. But if it doesn't happen at the end of this war some makeshift will take place, some weak league of nations or temporary confederacy.

But, I think, as you can be sure of anything, that we shall have more, worse, and bigger wars to come. Don't blame it on others. The mote is in our own eye. Though now we are at war, once the war is over, watch the American people swing back to isolationism. They will once again try to ignore geopolitics and think of the politics of thin continent or of the western hemisphere, try to withdraw within the boundaries of the Atlantic and the Pacific and say, "Let's leave the world alone." But the people who say that have upon their brows the brand of Cain, He who says, "Don't bother me about my neighbor, Am I my brother's keeper?" is alone responsible for our American isolationism.

We have a natural desire for the status quo because the status quo we had was so nice. Didn't we have a nice democracy going along here. Weren't we prosperous every ten years? Why not forget about the world and just try to get beck to that status quo that was so nice and for which we fought the war though we didn't say so at the time.

And finally we have a defect which is part of our good character, the defect of impatience. We want the good quickly. We want cash returns in a hurry. Any immediate solution, any rushed solution of this obviously is going to be faulty, superficial and without durability. Hence, I say, there probably will be after this war, more,


worse and bigger wars until a limit is reached, until men are forced to their knees with the realization that if they are going to stop being *brutes*, they *will* have to act *more like men*.

You may say to me, “With this conclusion, what can this lecture mean to me? The course of my life is going to be coextensive, then with the bad state of the world’s affairs. You predict nothing good for me. Though I be young or old, there will be more wars for my children and for myself. Why should I think about this?”

There is something for you to do right now because you have lived through the year 1942 when something has happened to the world’s consciousness. It is for you to become in spirit, in mind and spirit but mostly in imagination, a citizen of the world. Form for yourself always, when thinking of these problems, the image of the world, not the image of your country. Don’t ask “What do I want for America ” Say, “What do I want for the world?” Don’t say, “What kind of country would I like to live in?” say, “What kind of world would I like to live in?” The more people who do that, the more the idea will come to birth, not only in the *minds* of men, but in their *actions*. You and I will perhaps be, called upon within next ten years to vote on American foreign, policy in an election as crucial as the 1920 election. Even though the League of Nations was nothing, it still was significant and symptomatic of the movement. You remember how the American, people voted in 1920. You and I will be called upon to vote in 1944 or 1948 I hope, on a similar question. It is terribly important, even though we don’t get anywhere finally, that as many of us as possible move in the right direction then, by thinking of the world first and of America second.

Great moral stamina is required for this because you are thinking of a future good that is way beyond your lifetime. It is like a child now having to think of the good of a diploma when what he wants is to play. It is a very obvious human failing and weakness. May I remind you all that what the moral virtues are for, (Particularly the two chief ones in this connection,—temperance and fortitude) is to forgo immediate pleasures for a greater, good, and to endure present hardships and pain for a greater good without its even being possible to attain that greater good within your lifetime. If you are called upon to act for the community as well as for your own happiness, you are called upon to act for a community that includes those as yet unborn with those who have died. The community of man, the fellowship of man, the brotherhood of man moves in both directions in time as well as across the globe in space. It is for that community, coming to be slowly out of the turmoil, travail, pain

and bloodshed and death of man that you are called upon to act. And it requires forgoing immediate profits. It requires, in short, the moral virtues. It requires giving up the spirit of Cain.

Let me close, then, with the words of Lincoln. It is only if we have this spirit can it be said, or if we lack it the alternative presented to us all, in Lincoln's words, that "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last great hope of earth." 

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