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If there is some end of the things we do . . . will not knowledge of it, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is. —Aristotle

THE IDEAL OF HAPPINESS IN THE PRESENT

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Symbolically, Fromm suggests, the genital stage of man's sexual development, which for Freud is the ideal of health and excellence, denotes exactly what productiveness does. All we have to do is extend productiveness, which Freud emphasizes only in the biological sphere, to the material, social, political, artistic, scientific, and humanistic sectors of man's activity. This is quite an extension. But we find Erik H. Erikson making the same point. He recalls that, when Freud was once asked "what a normal man should be able to do well," he replied: "*Liehen und arheiten*" ("love and work"). When he said "love," Erikson explains, "he meant genital love, and genital love; and when he said love and work, he meant a general work-productiveness which would not preoccupy the individual to the extent that he loses his right or capacity to be a genital and a loving being. . . . We cannot improve on the formula which includes the doctor's prescription for human dignity—and for democratic living." The orgasm is not merely sexual:

The total fact of finding, via the climactic turmoil of the orgasm, a supreme experience of the mutual regulation of two human beings in some way breaks the point off the hostilities and potential rages caused by the oppositeness of male and female, of fact and fancy, of

love and hate. Satisfactory sex relations thus make sex less obsessive, overcompensation less necessary, sadistic controls superfluous.

Properly understood, Erikson insists, “the Utopia of genitality” includes:

1. mutuality of orgasm, 2. with a loved partner, 3. of the opposite sex, 4. with whom one is able and willing to share a mutual trust, 5. and with whom one is able and willing to regulate the cycles of a. work, b. procreation, c. recreation, 6. so as to secure to the offspring, too, a satisfactory development.

It might be said, then, that, while the revisionist Fromm goes beyond Freud’s genital ideal, Erikson, a staunch upholder of Freudian doctrine, carries Freud beyond himself. Fromm develops his idea of productiveness into a complete self-actualization theory; Erikson, taking up the same idea, makes some progress in the same direction.

As we have seen, Freud himself takes a dim view of the possibility of human happiness. For him, as Herbert Marcuse points out, “free gratification of man’s instinctual needs is incompatible with civilization: renunciation and delay in satisfaction are the prerequisites of progress.” “Happiness,” says Freud, ‘is no cultural value.’ Happiness must be subordinated to the discipline of work as full-time occupation, to the discipline of monogamic reproduction, to the established system of law and order. The methodological sacrifice of libido, its rigidly enforced deflection to socially useful activities and expression, is culture.” (Eros and Civilization, p. 3.) The price we have paid for the sacrifice of happiness, Marcuse says, is not too great; for it has resulted in civilization. He criticizes Fromm’s proposal that the therapist enter into a positive relation to his patient, unconditionally affirming his “claim for happiness,” as follows, “The ‘claim for happiness’ if truly affirmed, aggravates the conflict with a society which allows only controlled happiness, and the exposure of the moral taboos extends this conflict to an attack on the vital protective layers of society.” In a “repressive” society, the claim will not be tolerated. “The affirmative attitude toward the claim for happiness then becomes practicable only if happiness and ‘the productive development of personality’ are redefined so that they become compatible with prevailing values. ... In a repressive society, individual happiness and productive development are in contradiction to society; if they are denned as values to be realized within the society, they become themselves repressive.”

Putting the patient in a position to find his happiness might be said to be the aim of psychotherapy, according to Fromm, and this is

also Karen Horney's view. Horney's special emphasis, however, is on the actualization of the self via the gratification of its need for love and affection and recognition. It is as if she declared: "Take care of that, and the other things will follow." Like Fromm and the other self-actualization authors we have mentioned, and in line with the eudaemonistic and self-realization tradition from Aristotle on, Horney insists that happiness is an achievement that involves effort and entails risks which may frighten many from the pursuit. "Most patients," she says, "have known merely the partial satisfaction attainable within the boundaries set by their anxieties; they have never experienced true happiness nor have they dared to reach out for it. . . . The neurotic has been altogether engrossed in his pursuit of safety and has felt content when merely free from haunting anxiety, depressions, migraine and the like." Or, he has been so absorbed in his own pretended "unselfishness" that he fears to make claims for himself. Or, "he has expected happiness to shine on him like sunrays from the sky without his own active contribution." Analysis helps the patient to realize that the ground for happiness must be prepared within himself, that if he gives up the self-defeating demand for unconditional love, "he need not despair of obtaining happiness through love." The more he sheds his neurotic trends, "the more he becomes his own spontaneous self and can take care of his quest for happiness himself." In speaking of the difficulties of self-analysis, Horney says, "The ultimate driving force is the person's unrelenting will to come to grips with himself, a wish to grow and to leave nothing untouched that prevents growth. It is a spirit of ruthless honesty toward himself, and he can succeed in finding himself only to the extent that it prevails." It would be too much to say that Horney has developed a full-length self-actualization theory, but the tendency is in this direction, and in no other.

It should not be thought there are no differences among the authors we are discussing as to the nature of self-actualization or the self-actualization process, but in many cases they will be found to be minor. Their failure to criticize one another on the specific matters that concern us is significant. What seem to be outright differences may turn out to be matters of selective interest or emphasis. It will be remembered that Fromm, in his *Escape from Freedom*, maintains, as his central thesis, that many men—in fact the majority of the German electorate at the end of 1932—prefer security to freedom, dependence with protection to independence with its risks. Carl R. Rogers, on the contrary, says that

the urge for a greater degree of independence . . . the tendency to strive, even through much pain, toward a socialized maturity . . . is stronger than the desire for comfortable dependence, the need to rely

upon external authority for assurance. ... I have yet to find the individual who, when he examines his situation deeply, and feels that he understands it clearly, deliberately chooses to have the integrated direction of himself undertaken by another. When all the elements are clearly perceived, the balance seems invariably in the direction of the painful but ultimately rewarding path of self-actualization or growth.

Men do sometimes, in effect, prefer dependence to self-actualization, Rogers concedes, but when they do so they do not so much choose as drift into dependence without knowing exactly what they are doing. But this explanation of the matter is not wholly consistent with what Fromm says in *Escape from Freedom*.

Rogers is in close agreement with Goldstein when he states, as one of his basic principles, that “the organism has one basic tendency and striving—to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism ... all organic and psychological needs may be described as partial aspects of this one fundamental need.” The same accentuation of the self-actualization theory is to be found in Donald Snygg and A. W. Combs in their book *Individual Behavior* in which learning experiments are used to support the self-actualization thesis, and its advantages are shown in the sphere of counseling. In psychoanalysis, too, Rogers says, the therapist finds a powerful ally, even when he is dealing with patients on the brink of psychosis, in “the organic tendency toward ongoing growth and enhancement.”

That the psychotherapist should take advantage of the particular growth potentials present in the patient also is emphasized by Sanford. Endeavoring to state the function of psychotherapy with maximum breadth and acceptability, he says that its purpose “is to help the individual achieve fuller development.” There are strict limitations to what the therapist can do, of course. He cannot endow an adult with potentialities he lacks. He can, and must, “create conditions under which the individual’s inherent tendencies to growth have a fresh opportunity to express themselves.” By discussion and interpretations, he can help the patient to see his stance in the world in a different light, and to gradually restructure “his internal organization and . . . his system of interpersonal relationships [so] that obstacles to growth are removed and unused potentials are released.” Unlike education, which utilizes general capacity for growth, psychotherapy concentrates on individual capacity, employing the affect aroused to bring the patient to a new insight into his situation. Sanford remarks, however, that:

just as some procedures which have been called group therapy do not differ essentially from education, there is a tendency in education to

move in the direction of group therapy, using for teaching purposes the emotional processes operating in the teacher-class situation.

The urge to self-enhancement does not aim at pleasure, but its success is accompanied by pleasurable emotions, Rogers says. The striving to maintain and enhance the organism tends to be painful, but the painful emotions are not typically disintegrating, as some have claimed, but rather marshal and organize the effort. In one respect this formulation seems out of line with the tradition we are tracing, for this tradition maintains that perhaps the greatest pleasure man can have comes from the actualizing process itself—from the striving against opposition for the objects which enhance or are enhancing the self. But in the light of other things that Rogers says it seems likely that he does, after all, recognize that the excitement of the struggle itself is an important source of pleasure.

The self-actualization theories define the *ideal* of normality—or human excellence or happiness—in terms of growth, development, or actualization, and insist that the positive goal is the main thing. It is essential to eliminate mental inflexibilities and rigidities, constrained dependence, anxiety—unconscious determination of thought and action; the chief reason is that they are the obstacles to continued learning and growth. The accent is not on the avoidance of risks and dissatisfactions on a simplified level of existence but on the more or less hazardous quest of larger satisfactions. Recently, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago turned up some evidence that positive feelings of satisfaction are a much better indication of happiness than is freedom from dissatisfaction. Persons in four small Illinois towns (two of them economically depressed, one prosperous, and one on the upgrade) were questioned and interviewed about their state of happiness (“very happy,” “pretty happy” and “not too happy”), and about the frequency of their positive or “good” feelings and their negative or “bad” feelings, the balance of which seemed to correlate with the assessment of happiness. The study of some 2,000 subjects carried out so far supports the “central theme” of Dr. Norman M. Bradburn, the director of the project, that the relative unhappiness of the people living in the depressed communities derives, not from the greater number of negative feeling experiences but from the fact that there are far fewer opportunities to enjoy those life experiences that make a person feel “good.” Those experiences that “contribute to happiness by increasing the number of good feelings” were found to be “a high degree of social interaction and participation in the environment: seeing friends and relatives, talking with friends on the telephone, meeting new people, traveling, eating out, and belonging to organized groups.” But all forms of social interaction were reduced in the depressed communities. Thus,

Dr. Bradburn concludes: “It is the lack of joy in Mudville rather than the presence of sorrow that makes the difference.”

There are quite a number of other self-actualization theories we should have to mention if this review were to be complete. But the task now is to sum up briefly the respects in which self-actualization agrees with eudaemonism and self-realization, and also to indicate some ways in which it differs.

Let us begin by noting that, though it is a rare thing for contemporary psychologists and clinicians to relate themselves to the work of philosophers, some of our self-actualization authors do compare their theories to Aristotle’s eudaemonism and Spinoza’s self-realization theory. Fromm, for example, compares the “productiveness,” which for him is the measure of man’s happiness, with the productiveness that plays an important role in Aristotle’s ethics. In Aristotle’s view, Fromm says, “One can determine virtue ... by ascertaining the function of man. Just as in the case of a flute player, a sculptor, or any artist, the good is thought to reside in the specific function which distinguishes these men from others and makes them what they are, the good of man also resides in the specific function which distinguishes him from other species and makes him what he is.” Fromm then quotes a passage (1098b32, which we have given above) in which Aristotle says how important it is to take the chief good, or happiness, to be an activity rather than a state, and concludes, with approval, that, for Aristotle, the happy man is one “who by his activity, under the guidance of reason, brings to life the potentialities specific of man.” Fromm also finds his conception of productiveness delineated in Spinoza’s system in which, as we have seen, virtue consists in the realization of the natural powers of man. In the same way, Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza are cited for their views as to the relation of pleasure and happiness: Pleasure as an accompaniment of natural activities that perfects them, and that is the most valuable when it corresponds to our highest nature-theoretic reason; the qualitatively different kinds of pleasure; and the doctrine that the chief good is not pleasure, but happiness—the activity that actualizes human nature. In Spinoza’s system, Fromm particularly calls attention to the definition of joy, as “a passage from less to greater perfection” (or power); the famous last Proposition of the Ethics, “Blessedness (or happiness) is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself . . .” and the implied doctrine that productive activity is the end of life, and pleasure merely its accompaniment.

Maslow also finds his key conception—self-actualization—anticipated in part by Aristotle and Spinoza. The difference is that

these philosophers did not know as much about human beings as we do today—nothing about recent discoveries in human motivation and psychopathology. Consequently, he says, “we may agree with Aristotle when he assumed that the good life consisted in living in accordance with the true nature of man, but we must add that he simply did not know enough about the true nature of man.”

In her monograph, published by the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, Marie Jahoda describes and evaluates, in a provisional way, six current concepts of mental health, viz.:

1. Growth, Development, Self-actualization
2. Attitudes Toward the Self
3. Integration
4. Autonomy
5. Perception of Reality
6. Environmental Mastery

The first concept is, of course, the self-actualization we have been discussing. The authors representing the second concept emphasize one or more of the following points: “The accessibility of the self to the consciousness of the subject, the correctness of the subject’s judgments about the self, and self-acceptance, i.e., easy acceptance of unavoidable limitations of the self, together with a readiness to consider the gains and cost of removing remediable faults.

Under the third concept, Integration, Jahoda mentions “a balance between psychic forces,” an example of which is the ideal interplay of ego, superego, and id. According to Kubie and others who follow Freud in this respect, the conscious forces should be at the helm and the influence of the unconscious forces reduced to a minimum. This favors flexibility, readiness to learn and to change, and excludes automatic or compulsive repetition which characterizes neuroses, in Freud’s view, and the misery that attends them. There are two other aspects of Integration that may be given prominence: “A unifying outlook on life,” and “resistance to stress.”

Concerning the three last concepts, or “criteria,” of mental health, Jahoda states that they all “share an explicit emphasis on reality-orientation.”

Autonomy, as Jahoda understands it, has to do either with the process of decision-making or the independent behavior that results, and the author, insisting on one, naturally gives some attention to the other. The broadest characterization of this concept, perhaps, would be that the autonomous individual is self-determining rather than “self-surrendering,” that is, determined by the person or character rather than by chance exigencies in personal or social life. (A similar division of the goal of the autonomy is made by Fr. Duyckaerts, in his *La Notion de Normal en Psychologie Clinique*; namely, independence in relation to oneself, and independence in relation to others. The first means that the individual can determine his own actions by choice and determine his own character, to some extent at least. The second means that the adult has been able to overcome his childish dependence on the attitudes of others, his need to bow to their superior wisdom or authority, and relies mostly on himself. Such a man is independent, self-reliant, “inner-directed” as opposed to “other-directed,” whereas the neurotic is characterized by submission and dependence.)

The fifth concept, Perception of Reality, is described under two headings, which are self-explanatory, viz.: “perception free from need-distortion,” and “empathy or social sensitivity.” Here the requirement of cognitive correctness is not to be understood as excluding individual differences in perception and appraisal. Sound people can see and feel things differently, Jahoda says, as long as they do not distort reality to fit their wishes. “The mentally healthy person will test reality for its degree of correspondence to his wishes or fears. One lacking mental health will assume such correspondence without testing.”

The sixth concept, Environmental Mastery, is discussed under headings that again speak for themselves: The ability to love; Adequacy in love, work, and play; Adequacy in interpersonal relations; Meeting of situational requirements; Adaptation and adjustment; and Problem-solving.

A number of observations now can be made about these concepts as they relate to happiness: (a) Jahoda’s classification is based on the literature; any other sophisticated roundup of the prevailing requirements for positive mental health would be quite similar. Thus the French philosopher Duyckaerts lists the following leading conceptions of “the normal” as Integration, Autonomy, Adaptation, the Average or statistical mean, and Creativity, as opposed to frustration. The last seems to resemble very closely Fromm’s “productiveness,” and other conceptions of the self-actualization authors,

(b) There is a great deal of overlap of Jahoda's six concepts, as she herself points out. The authors who stand for self-actualization, she says, include in it the elements of concept 2, *i.e.*, accessibility of the self, self-acceptance, etc. Some of them—Maslow, Allport, and Dr. M. May-man, she adds, adopt elements of most of her concepts. It will be clear from the first section of this chapter that Fromm certainly adopts such a "multiple-criterion" position, and that other self-actualization authors appear to do so. There is indeed a tremendous amount of overlap. Conceptually it is difficult to see how Environmental Mastery, as described, can be realized without the realization of all the other five concepts, (c) Concepts 2-6 are not opposed to concept 1, unless they are taken as sufficient in themselves, apart from self-actualization, or self-actualization authors reject or ignore them.

Consider the first alternative: If Integration is conceived as independent of Growth, Development, Self-actualization, then a man could achieve a fine integration on a level far below his gifts and capacities, and come out of a successful analysis only half alive. If care were taken to eliminate every vestige of the requirement that full potentialities must be actualized from concepts 2 and 4-6, would not the result be the same? The goal of therapy would be the adjustment of a man to his environment, or self-awareness and self-acceptance, or perception and mastery of the environment as it is, or all of these at once, by the easiest, most convenient route, even though potentials should be sacrificed. Autonomy itself might turn out to be governed by prudence.

Concepts 2-6, if clearly demarcated from self-actualization, often seem to be viewed as means to self-actualization, that is, to the fulfillment of human desires when gifts and capacities are fully exploited. We have seen, in fact, that self-realization authors, though they assign focal importance to growth, development, self-realization, also tend to recognize the need for the other requirements in the Jahoda list. The more elaborate the description of self-actualization, the more these subsidiary concepts are acknowledged.

(d) In criticism of the self-actualization concept, Jahoda complains that it is not clear whether the process is supposed to be going on in all organisms, or only in healthy ones.

It is not always easy to distinguish these two meanings in the mental health literature. This lack of clarity probably has something to do with the controversial philosophical concept of Aristotelian teleology, to which the notion of realizing one's potentialities is related. The need for making the distinction in a discussion of mental health

becomes urgent if one realizes that not only the development of civilization but also self destruction and crime . . . are among the unique potentialities of the human species.

The Aristotelian answer, in brief, would be that self-destruction would not be an actualization of human nature, but rather the annihilation of human faculties and potentialities, and that crime, similarly, would be inconsistent with moral virtues, such as friendship, prudence, self-esteem, and justice, which are necessary for self-actualization or happiness. A like answer might be made on behalf of contemporary self-actualization authors. They all understand self-actualization to be an ongoing process, development being a means to further development, not to frustration. Moreover, as Jahoda points out, they all include “self-accessibility” and “self-acceptance” as requirements. We have seen also that those self-actualization authors who go into detail include also the other main requirements 3-6 as subsidiary concepts. Could a destructive nature meet all these requirements?

Jahoda makes the sound observation, which we find also in Sanford, Allport, Fromm, and other self-actualization authors, that self-actualization cannot mean actualization of all the individual's potentialities; the full development of his mathematical potential might prevent the full development of his musical capacity. She points out that no one would say that because a man made a great success of music while neglecting his mathematical talent he must lack mental health. Nor is it likely that anyone would claim that such a man could not be happy. Differentiation and specialization could be as important as breadth, in one case as in the other.

(e) The question remains whether self-actualization can be identified. Jahoda complains that empirical criteria are scarce and imprecise, but goes on to mention the useful classification of students into “under-achievers” and “over-achievers,” and the further criterion furnished by time budgets, showing what percentage of his time a man spends in interests that go beyond his job and the requirements of living. There are other criteria, it might be added, such as the percentage increase of cultural expenditures with rising income, and the relation between IQ, and scores on aptitude and ability tests, on the one hand, and achievement levels, on the other. In the analytic situation, Duyckaerts argues, “the notions of creativity and frustration correspond to real properties of behavior, which can be apprehended directly, by minute and patient analysis, in the phenomenal field of the individual.” When the examination of the potentialities and progress of the individual toward actualizing them is superficial, the criteria are rough and ready, and leave much to be desired; when it is concrete and exhaustive, the results

are generally found pretty reliable. And since self-actualization authors usually recognize the auxiliary role of the other concepts in Jahoda's list, the tests available for these concepts can be expected to give some support to the tests for self-actualization as well.

(f) It naturally makes some difference that Jahoda is concerned with "positive mental health," whereas we are interested in happiness, but not much. Happiness without positive mental health would be a dubious combination, however the two are conceived, and impossible, we hold, if they are conceived according to eudaemonism and self-actualization, respectively; while positive mental health without a share of happiness would not be worth the therapeutic costs. Self-actualization authors often use happiness as synonymous with self-actualization, we have noted, and probably all of them would do so if they did not associate "happiness" with hedonism, a view they all wish to reject. Secondly, the tests for positive mental health seem to be relevant to happiness as well, and the decision is rated the same in importance.

It perhaps will be useful to point out again why the self-actualization conception of positive mental health is uniquely pertinent to the theory of happiness. With regard to all the other concepts in Jahoda's list, we may ask what purpose they serve; they do not seem to be final ends but rather high-order means. We may ask why the self should be accessible, and why the self is to be accepted, why a certain kind of integration is desirable, why more rather than less autonomy should be sought, why facing reality is better than wishful thinking, and why mastering the environment is better than taking it easy. All such questions make sense. On the contrary, the question why you want to cash in on your assets, i.e., to satisfy as many of your desires as possible, given continuing development of your potentials, sounds somewhat preposterous. It is understood that everyone automatically wants to satisfy as many of his desires as possible, and that, if the cultivation of one's capacities results in more or better satisfactions, the gain is self-evident.

Maximum satisfaction of desires corresponding to a full development of human faculties and individual abilities may be the ideal, some will say, but because its achievement is dangerous and precarious it is better to settle for a poorer but surer level of satisfaction. Whatever the wisdom of this advice may be, it is not the prevailing counsel in this "affluent" society. Politicians and educators no longer tell the people to be content with a modest lot, really below their capacities, but proclaim, as the economy continues to expand, the indefinite enlargement of individual life.

Satisfaction" here includes surprise satisfaction, which is experienced

prior to the desire for it. Thus one is surprised by the beauty of the landscape, which one had not anticipated, though one would not enjoy it now if one had not desired this kind of thing in the past. Some call it “serendipity.”

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